Eight pixels ber byte would indeed be more efficient, but the intent of this library was to make the hidden message as discreet as possible, rather than transmit as much hidden data as possible.
By modifying only occasional pixels, in an unpredictable pattern (based on a secure hash of the key), my hope was that it would make detection more difficult. Whether I succeeded or not remains to be determined, I suppose.
A simple microservice (as a Docker image) that parses any Cassandra query or command (CQL) and returns a JSON object describing what the command is. This uses Cassandra's own parser, therefore it works with any valid CQL command.
I respectfully disagree. Like I said in the article, transmitting the password, rather than some form of token, means that this approach is exactly as insecure as HTTP basic auth over TLS, and how many serious enterprise apps use that?
>> we'd probably be better off using some sort of PAKE protocol
Yes, that's my whole point. This problem has been solved, there are tons of libraries, it's not that hard. Why have a weak link like this?
If everything is secured correctly, this is not a vulnerability, but how often are things 100% secured properly? TLS is fine, but many people use a self-signed certificate, which means a MITM attack is often possible. It's bad enough to have someone snoop on your connection, but to have your password compromised... And if your client is not Windows, it often has to use database authentication.
This just stinks. It's especially surprising in an enterprise-class system like SQL Server.
> transmitting the password, rather than some form of token, means that this approach is exactly as insecure as HTTP basic auth over TLS, and how many serious enterprise apps use that?
Isn't that also exactly as insecure as submitting an HTML form with <input type="password"> is? And I can't think of any enterprise apps that don't use either HTTP basic auth or that over TLS. Which ones are you thinking of?
> Isn't that also exactly as insecure as submitting an HTML form with <input type="password"> is?
Absolutely, but I am arguing that this is not worthy of an enterprise system like SQL Server. This is especially true for a back-end system, because at least in a web browser, you'd get a warning if the certificate cannot be verified (and the connection is therefore vulnerable).
> Which ones are you thinking of?
Most of the enterprise apps I have worked with use something like OAuth or SAML. For sure, many have an option to use basic auth, but that's only used for testing and development, and would be a red flag in any security audit.
Disadvantages of SQL Server Authentication
The encrypted SQL Server Authentication login password, must be passed over the network at the time of the connection.
It's good that they acknowledge it, but it would be a lot better if they did something about it.
> Most of the enterprise apps I have worked with use something like OAuth or SAML.
If an app is a SAML SP or an OAuth client, then it's not really doing authentication itself, but rather delegating it to another system. When you go to log in to the SAML IdP or the OAuth authorization server, where the authentication actually happens, don't they let you use HTTP basic authentication or <input type="password">?
You're right, I should not have gone on that tangent.
To get back to the main point, though, don't you think that the fact that Microsoft includes a disclaimer (kinda) in their docs lends some credence to the idea that they're not really proud of this?
Like I said, I agree things could be better. I just don't think things are currently quite as bad as your original article makes them sound, and I also think it's unfair to single out SQL Server as if it were worse than normal, when it's exactly the same as basically everything else today.
That's a reasonable position, and I think a good conclusion to a constructive debate.
Whether it's unfair to single out SQL Server -- I don't think it is. SQL Server is one of the foundations of modern IT infrastructure, and it should be held to the highest standard. This is clearly a chink in the armor, and Microsoft seems to be aware of it.
The giant green button at the bottom is just slimy -- I fell for it. No, I don't want to install your Protecto extension, whatever the frack it is. Geez.
