No, it is not AI generated. It was based on my research.
I think there is a mix-up here between Atari home consoles and Atari home computers.
In that section I was talking about early console platforms such as the Atari 2600, where the cartridge interface itself had no lockout/authentication mechanism comparable to what Nintendo later did with the 10NES. That is why third-party cartridges could exist and Atari’s main response was legal rather than technical.
What you describe for the Atari 800 is real, but it belongs to a different context: the Atari 8-bit computer line, especially floppy-disk software, where copy-protection tricks such as intentional bad sectors and timing-based checks were indeed common.
So I agree that Atari computer software often used copy protection, but that does not contradict the point I was making about the early console era.
Hi, quick note on "For modern Xbox platforms, public 2024 work exposed SystemOS kernel exploitation on both Xbox One and Xbox Series"
I'm a former Xbox hacker, then former Microsoft employee, and (long after) leaving Microsoft helped with the Collateral Damage post-exploitation payload.
The design of the Xbox One security predates me, but Microsoft has always known that SystemOS would be a weak link that would almost guaranteed to be compromised and shoved most of their attack surface that can be trivially attacked in there. The system shell, 3rd-party apps, guide, etc. all run in SystemOS.
The key things they focused on though were:
1. Extremely strong defense-in-depth
2. Making full or partial exploitation not economical
3rd party apps and the web browser were seen as being obviously untrusted _and_ needed JIT because they'd mostly be based on .NET or the JS VM. But practically speaking there should be nothing interesting in that VM: its compromise shouldn't enable piracy/cheating and ideally shouldn't leak game plaintext.
What some others found though was that for some reason plaintext was actually visible to SystemOS, but didn't enable piracy on console. You can take those games though and run them on PC using XWine1: https://github.com/xwine1
Technically speaking there's no reason why Collateral Damage couldn't have happened waayyyyy earlier in the Xbox One's lifecycle except for motivation. Even still you could probably take some Hyper-V N-day and compromise HostOS through.
Over there years there have been other "exploits" too: some folks have managed to tamper with gamesaves via cloud connected storage and other shenanigans, XSS in the system shell (some of these apps are JS), etc., but most of this was relatively benign and easily patchable. And there has been a very, very small group of people with similar but less capable exploits to Collat.
After some time without posting on my blog, I decided to get back to it — and my first post after the break is about the history of video game security! There are also some great stories along the way, like Atari reverse-engineering Nintendo’s lockout system, or how simply changing the name of Link's horse became an attack vector on the Nintendo Wii. I had a lot of fun researching and writing this article, and I learned a lot in the process. I hope you enjoy it too!
Thanks I did enjoy it! One thing is, I feel like the PS1 wobble disc protection, although bypassed with swaps and mod chips, it has never been possible (besides one historic example: Datel) for someone other than Sony to make a disc bootable on the console. I feel like most PS1's weren't modded so it was quite a well done lockout. But I understand that wasn't your main point - just that it was a surprisingly effective copy protection.
Did you know there is a dedicated partition in the eMMC called RPMB that makes it possible to store data with integrity and authenticity support? In this article, we will learn what the RPMB partition is and how it works, its main use cases, and how to access it on Linux.
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