Not sure net income would tell you that much either. Many companies deliberately keep net income low by reinvesting in further growth. Think of Amazon's model. At least revenue gives you a sense of the upper limit.
But revenue has even more issues. You’ll end up hurting low margin companies the most.
If my company transacted $1T in some boring business model that netted a few million to the company coffers and employee pay then fining me on the $1T would simply wipe the company out many times over
Agreed, fine on net income is meaningless it just mean it won't hurt. Should be at least 10% of revenue like antitrust tend to do, this would make anyone think twice.
I don't think anyone is implying Google pays differently based on visa status. The implication is that Google would rather hire a foreign worker who is willing to accept lower wages as opposed hiring locally - and therefore put downward pressure on all employees wages.
Irrespective of the reason, this really makes me sad. Vice had made some of the most incredible content and dared to go places others simply wouldn't.
As a Pakistani, I can tell you it's very rare to see media go there. Even movies that are supposed to be set in Pakistan (Zero Dark Thirty, A Mighty Heart, etc) are filmed next door in India. And other than maybe Al-Jazeera, I rarely see international media reporting from on the ground.
Vice not only went to Pakistan, but they did at least three episodes I can recall from there. And they covered some pretty important things, such as the disfunction that resulted in Pakistan being one of the last countries to still have polio.
I speak of Pakistan as one example because I know how little our stories are represented in mainstream media, but there are many other examples where Vice seemed to be the only ones willing to go on the ground. Other examples include North Korea, Haiti, and Syria. I'll never forget watching Isobel Yeung courageously reporting in Syria while bombs literally could be heard exploding around her.
Can you explain what TF is going on with Imran Khan? Everyone I see talking about it is either American or Indian and I'm sure they're wrong about basically every detail.
To understand what's going on requires a deep understanding of Pakistan and its "military-veto democracy". This is the best explanation I've seen, from a veteran Indian journalist: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0boy9JdZfWE
tl;dw: The powers-that-be in Pakistan -- the army and whichever political dynasty the army favors that day -- routinely overrule the popular vote because they don't believe that democracy will always spit out the best candidate. This is partly due to arrogance but also because the institutions that are supposed to keep a check on harmful populism in Pakistan are broken or corrupt. These powers-that-be have decided that IK is bad for Pakistan (twist: they're probably right about this; IK is a religious fundamentalist and a giveaway socialist in a country that is broke) and have invoked "special measures" to keep his name off the ballot or the ballot away from the people. Understandably, this has angered the people who have taken to the streets.
My impression (from western sources) is that he adopted religion and married a religious wife to distance himself from his western playboy past and broaden his political appeal. He chose a wife who is Sufi, which is a form of Islam that is legally accepted in Pakistan but which has been attacked for not being strict enough, because it focuses more on religious experience and less on religious rules than conservative scholars would like.
It seems like a smart choice for a politician who needed to cement his religious status to be viable in an overwhelmingly religious country but wanted to avoid the appearance of insincerity or hypocrisy in cases where he decides not to support conservative religious political policies.
These psychological explanations are post hoc justifications. Instead of pretending to know what internally motivates people, it's far more practical and fruitful (and dangerous) to look at who finances people. I guarantee the reason isn't because the army (whichever army or "whatever political dynasty") just wants what's best for people.
What happened to Imran Khan is similar to what happened to and continues to happen to world leaders in unstable countries where the west financial and/or national security interests - sloppy regime changes.
As far as whether or not this turns out for the people of PK, we will never know bc he was nto in office long enough to do anything meaningful. PK needs like 20 yrs of stability to see any real progress.
I will say this - Imran Khan was very popular among the young, middle class types I know in PK (bc he is a populist), but not liked by western establishment governments. Take that for what it is worth.
The military have quite a strong political influence in Pakistan I think?
There is some parallel to Turkey, the military there had a lot of influence, until Erdogan out maneuvered them. The military in Turkey were supposedly protecting democracy and keeping the state secular, but threatening coups against democratically elected politicians doesn't scream protecting democracy to me.
European countries had a working relationship with Erdogan in the beginning because of this. Obviously power corrupted in the end.
It feels like a similar situation with Imran Khan (both did time in prison on politically motivated charges), but I don't know enough about Pakistani politics to be sure.
The reason for the strong political influence of the military is two fold:
1. Political institutions in Pakistan are very weak and when things start to truly go bad, people look toward the military to bring law and order and not their elected leaders. This in turn gives the military a seat at the table to impact internal matters and foreign relations.
2. India - using India as a general boogeyman since independence has given the military brass a lot of money and power. They in turn use this to further their political ideology and when things start to go a way they don’t like they can start a coup. In turn the people generally go along with this as they think army control might be better than their leaders to solve their issues.
Like it was mentioned, Pakistan needs a few decades of peaceful democracy to get their shit together. Otherwise it will keep circling the drain of being a failed state.
This was my take as well. Kahn signed an arms deal with Russia just days before the Ukrainian conflict happened. Less than two weeks after the invasion happened he was ousted from office. Pretty unusual, Imran Kahn has been wildly popular in Pakistan for decades, since at least the mid-1980s where he was a Cricket (sport) superstar
Imran Khan is one of a very few leaders in that entire region who is not corrupt, by general consensus. His political program is heavily social (practically socialist), as well as (unsurprisingly) anti-corruption. These are all great things, if you are the average Pakistani, hence his popularity.
Whether he is a good leader for the country is another matter. He is principled to a fault, which is probably also his downfall. In the world of realpolitik, he probably never stood a chance. It is questionable if he could ever actually carry out his policies, having antagonized practically the entire state apparatus.
I am not Pakistani but I was always surprised at the lack of attention too. Pakistan is a giant country with a ton of people and some pretty insane geography (mountains I mean) and yet there is not much media made in general about it.
It wouldn't be beneath VICE to use sound editing to put bomb sounds into takes that didn't have them there to begin with. They quite literally have no journalism code of ethics.
Because Amazon actually assumes a 15% growth in stock price every year. So even if the stock stays flat, you make 15% less. I used to be a manager there.
As someone who lives within biking distance of this museum and has visited it on multiple occasions, I can assure you this is very much in Seattle and not in Silicon Valley.
Ah, I've hallucinate it was in Oakland. My apologies. You're totally right. Mind you -- to extend my mistake-- they might have a better chance if they moved to the bay area. Not to minimize in any way the difficulties they are experiencing.
> The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined, produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision.
Sam Harris would say that having the "consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined" is exactly what he means when he says we don't have free will. If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the contents of the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense?
Furthermore, the act of selecting from the menu of decisions is itself another decision. This is the recursive "choosing to choose" I've referred to in comments in this thread. How do you choose to choose? How do you choose to choose to choose? At some point, the recursion must stop at some unconscious decision.
So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares?
There's a good footnote in Dennett's paper that speaks to this point:
''I'm writing a book on magic," I explain, and I'm asked, "Real magic?" By real magic
people mean miracles, thaumaturgical, and supernatural powers. "No," I answer:
"Conjuring tricks, not real magic."
Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that
is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic. (p42S)
-Lee Siegel, Net of Magic
I'd rather talk about free will that can actually exist, than complain about free will that doesn't and can't exist.
> If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense?
It's certainly better than not being able to choose anything--or worse, being forced to suffer the consequences of the bad choices of others.
Dennett makes a comment in one of his books on this topic: "There are very real threats to our freedom, but they are not metaphysical." Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. Sorry, not buying it.
> So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares?
Because it's a poor rhetorical tactic, one used quite often in this and other topics, that confuses the subject rather than adding clarity and mutual understanding. Redefining the subject of a debate in the middle of such a debate is a recipe for talking past one another (which these two have done at length multiple times and never seem to quite understand how much they're talking past one another, or at least never acknowledge it so as to "win" more) rather than coming to a better understanding. Neither one can be wrong or right because neither really acknowledges the other, they're just sort of talking about related (but different) subjects at the same time using the same term in different ways, to the consternation of passer bys who end up joining one camp or the other not realizing they can easily be in both.
> Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back.
That's not what it tells them at all, and indeed this is a common point of confusion that could be alleviated without all the talking past one another. A better synthesis would be:
- Acknowledge one does not directly author one's own thoughts (either by way of the vast literature of neuroscience or simply closely observing the nature of thought)
- Acknowledge the vast role of forces outside our direct individual control in our understanding of ourselves and others
- Acknowledge our ignorance of full causation of any given thought or action and the scoping differences of emergent systems
- Acknowledge regardless of the first two and because of the third at an individual and societal level there is very real meaning to responsibility and attribution of action to a locus of control (be that individual or grouping of individuals)
Compatibilism (of which Dennett is a proponent) more or less just says the 4th is actually compatible with the 1st. And that's completely reasonable, but we'd save a lot of time in these debates by taking great pains to acknowledge the difference in scope and context as opposed to arguing which one we want to call "free will."
> And that's completely reasonable, but we'd save a lot of time in these debates by taking great pains to acknowledge the difference in scope and context as opposed to arguing which one we want to call "free will."
Except Dennett's use is compatible with how laypeople seem to reason morally [1], and it further agrees with centuries of legal precedent that accounts for free choice, so there is a good justification for defining this as free will.
I also reject the framing that free will already had a definition that Compatibilists are trying to redefine. The whole debate is about what qualities free will has that can make sense of choice and responsibility. This debate didn't start with "free will must have qualities X, Y or it's not free will", it started with discussion about what sorts of control we may have over choices and what this entails about our responsibility, and free will is the descriptor for the kind of choice that entails responsibility.
Compatibilism provides a coherent definition that largely matches how people talk about and reason about this topic, so exactly why should that not settle the debate and require us all to understand that this is free will?
This seems to me like more of the same talking past this subject is rife with. I didn't purport to frame any such definition as "first," the context of my reply was referring specifically to a Dennett rebuttal to a Harris essay, which is by definition not first.
To me the semantics of what one wants to call free will really don't matter and aren't worth much discussion, yet they seem to be primarily what gets discussed. What matters is clarity and context (context being do you want to talk about how minds and the universe works or do you want to talk about moral or societal responsibility), and trying discuss which one ought to be called free will seems to me to be yak shaving.
I'd agree the debate is actually fairly largely settled for now, as I pointed out in my bullets in the previous reply. There is still much to figure out about neurology and the origin of thought, and about societal cohesion, but the fundamentals there seem pretty solid for as long as we're mostly human. I add that last caveat because I think these concerns actually do start to merge once a mind is capable of fully experiencing and conceptually recognizing causal lines (physical, chemical, or otherwise), which certainly seems to be not in the cards for us biologically and may even be theoretically impossible, but I wouldn't rule out just yet. In such a world with such minds things would look quite a bit different, and there would be much less daylight between every day morality and mechanistic functions underlying the minds a play.
> To me the semantics of what one wants to call free will really don't matter and aren't worth much discussion, yet they seem to be primarily what gets discussed.
It matters quite a bit I think, because otherwise it's an impediment to communication. Just look around at all the pushback from unnecessary changes to language due to so-called "wokeness". If a term has a coherent conception and is mostly well understood and commonly utilized by people, I don't see the value in trying to change that language.
In this context, Harris is just one in a long line of people leveling this accusation that Compatibilism is changing the definition of free will, where it seems instead that it empirically matches how people actually use this term.
This is not to say that you specifically were making this argument, but it's been implicit (and sometimes explicit) undercurrent in this whole thread.
> It matters quite a bit I think, because otherwise it's an impediment to communication.
It sounds like we agree on the problem but disagree on the solution. I would argue most of the impediment to communication on this subject is exactly because people are trying much too hard to brand a certain conceptualization "free will" and trying to delineate different contexts and scenarios far too little. It's absolutely worthwhile to clarify what context one is referring to when using the term. It's absolutely a waste of time to try and assert this context is the only correct context to do so.
I agree that we can find broad agreement on the facts if we replace "free will" with baggage-free terms, but this still leaves open the question of what people actually mean when they hold someone responsible for a freely made choice, and whether this is justified. Under Compatibilism it is, but otherwise it mostly isn't.
In my experience, everyone arguing about brains and the universe is trying to justify something like the Consequence Argument, in which I think my insistence on a Compatibilist definition of free will is justified.
> everyone arguing about brains and the universe is trying to justify something like the Consequence Argument
That hasn't been my experience at all, usually I see claims about the brains and universe being made from epistemic grounds, and indeed they are valuable in of themselves even if purely academic. The nature of our reality is worth discovering on its own merit, rather than just discarding in favor of saying that's not what we're really talking about (when indeed some of us are talking about that!).
I agree that investigation into how the brain and the universe works is valuable. I was saying that whenever they are brought up in the context of a discussion of free will and moral responsibility it's because they're building up to a type of Consequence Argument. If you still disagree, then perhaps you can provide an example of what you mean because I'm not getting the distinction you're trying to make.
> it further agrees with centuries of legal precedent that accounts for free choice, so there is a good justification for defining this as free will.
Of all possible reasons to argue for compatibalism, I would not choose this.
Historical precedent is often wrong, and often horribly so. This particular issue happens to be one that leaves us mostly in the dark while many of the provably incorrect historical precedents have been addressed by growing scientific knowledge.
As neuroscience progresses and converges with philosophical thoughts on the subject, I think philosophers will have stronger ground to build on. Until then, I’m not looking to historical precedent for answers, on a topic that seems very incompatible with such a source of wisdom.
> Compatibilism provides a coherent definition that largely matches how people talk about and reason about this topic, so exactly why should that not settle the debate and require us all to understand that this is free will?
“Religion and the existence of god provides a coherent framework that largely matches how people talk and reason about existence and morality, so exactly why should that not settle the debate and require us to all understand that this is our origin?”.
This is a sentence that would not have raised very many eyebrows at one time. It seems that you are arguing for compatibilism on the basis that it matches how people currently make sense of our notions of free will?
Accepting “good enough” approximations, especially when examining issues of ethics and morality seems extremely problematic and likely to create blind spots.
> “Religion and the existence of god provides a coherent framework that largely matches how people talk and reason about existence and morality, so exactly why should that not settle the debate and require us to all understand that this is our origin?”.
Except that's wrong. Theism is not a coherent framework at all, and it doesn't at all explain our origins in a way that's compatible with observation. By contrast, Compabitilism is a coherent framework in which to reason about choice and responsibility, and it agrees with how people intuitively approach this as tested empirically, and it agrees with one of the greatest ethical equalizers we've found: law.
You can crap on the law all you want, but it was the first great step towards social justice that tore down the power of monarchs and divine rule and started the process of treating all people on equal footing. Science has an equally storied history of mistakes, and yet you clearly value its current state, and so I'm saying don't be so dismissive of progress and precedent in law. It too has been shaped deep of philosophical debate among tens of thousands of people over hundreds of years. Don't fail to learn the lessons of the past.
> Except that's wrong. Theism is not a coherent framework at all, and it doesn't at all explain our origins in a way that's compatible with observation.
This misses the point, and I'd ask that you reframe how you read my statement as a thought experiment. Saying this is wrong is a claim you can now confidently make within the context of a system of understanding that has advanced far beyond the confines of what religion could explain. The inherent limits of religion necessitated some better explanation.
Prior to the existence of that new understanding, and during the time in which that new understanding was brand new, appeals to "how people talk and reason" were appeals to religion, and the arguments for it perfectly coherent given the tools of thought available at the time. As science introduced new tools, consensus thinking shifted accordingly.
My point is that an argument for compatibilism that appeals to the common vernacular as a primary point of validation is not a very convincing argument.
> You can crap on the law all you want, but it was the first great step towards social justice...
This is a binary mindset, and I'm not crapping on the law - it is both valuable and necessary. Finding issues with certain laws or modes of thinking about law are not an implication that laws are not useful. The point is that laws are just a tool, and are not by themselves an indicator of enlightenment or the best possible solution. We know this to be true by looking at the reform of immoral/unethical laws over time. The underlying frameworks of understanding used to author laws within the legal system are just as important as the legal system itself (see: abortion, slavery, segregation...).
If we only used the good things law has achieved to justify the existence of other laws, gay marriage would still be illegal, most states would still be incarcerating people for smoking weed, and segregation would still be alive and well.
> Science has an equally storied history of mistakes, and yet you clearly value its current state, and so I'm saying don't be so dismissive of progress and precedent in law.
I don't think I'm dismissing any progress or precedent at all. I'm saying we should not use precedent to stop us from making progress. This is something science is better at than some disciplines, but even science remains susceptible to dogma and binary thinking.
> Don't fail to learn the lessons of the past.
As a form of argument about philosophy, this is a problematic conclusion. At a minimum, you would need to explain why some lessons are better to learn than others, and on what basis they are better or worse.
But setting that aside, and in the context of our understanding of the science of human consciousness, why is there any implication at all that exploring the true nature of free will is incompatible with learning from the past?
Better to have SOME definition than spend eternity going back and forth with "we DO SO have free will" "nuh-uh we don't" "yuh-uh we do!" "NUH-UH WE DON'T" without ever actually defining what we mean by it, which is how 99% of discussions of free will seem to end up.
And then someone says "wait what does this term even mean" and gets piled on with "oh so we're just going to quibble about definitions, are we?"
I really detest this "rebuttal", because it assumes some authoritative definition of free will exists. It does not. The whole point of the free will debate is come to an understanding of what free will actually is, that makes sense of our language and moral reasoning around choice and responsibility.
Guess what? Sam Harris' definition of free will will (incompatibilism) is inconsistent with how most laypeople seem to reason morally, while Dennett's (Compatibilism) is on the money:
